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1 This book has several very positive qualities; but its project raises certain important
questions,  which  are  not  wholly  addressed  by  the  book  itself.  First,  and  most
fundamentally:  what  is  the  subject?  The  title  cites  two  notions:  individuality  and
subjectivity, both of which are quite complex. The first idea, ‘individuality’, can denote
‘unique personal identity’ (as distinct from the identity of any other person); and Stoic
versions of this idea play a prominent role at certain stages of this study. However,
much of  the  book seems to  have  a  broader,  and rather  different,  concept  in  view,
namely, ‘individuation humaine’,  that is,  the capacity or property that distinguishes
human  beings  as  such  from  other  animals.  Implicitly  at  least,  this  is  a  capacity
belonging  to  human  beings  viewed  as  distinct  entities  or  agents,  rather  than  as
members  of  groups  or  participants  in  relationships,  though  this  point  is  not
accentuated in  the  book.  In  fact,  to  judge  from the  main topics  of  discussion,  this
capacity is  largely  conceived as  that  of  psychological  agency,  for  decision,  will  and
deliberate action. This capacity is closely linked with (though not exclusively defined
by)  subjectivity,  understood  in  rather  broad  terms  as  self-reflexiveness,  self-
management, or self-relationship more generally. Thus, overall, the book’s subject is
that of Stoic ideas on this complex of ideas, though presented as an account of ‘individu
singulier qu’est le sujet humain’ (on the back cover and often elsewhere). 
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2 A second question raised by the book is this. The ideas just noted, along with cognate
ones  such  as  ‘self’,  ‘person’  (and  their  analogues  in  other  languages)  have  figured
prominently  in  modern  European  theory,  with  thinkers  including  Descartes,  Kant,
Nietzsche,  Sartre,  and  Foucault,  shaping  the  modern  understanding  of  them.  More
recently, there has been active scholarly debate, involving, among others, Sorabji and
myself, about how far these modern ideas have ancient equivalents. Bourbon refers,
rather glancingly, to the modern history of these ideas and the scholarly debate about
their relevance to antiquity. However, in general, she seems confident that these ideas
can be applied, unproblematically, to Stoic thought, and, indeed that we can find there
the ‘genesis’ of these ideas, though this last claim is not explained very fully, except by
highlighting what she sees as the relevant Stoic ideas. I am less confident than she is on
this point; but, in any case, I think the book would have benefited from fuller reflection
on  this  question  and  its  implications  for  critical  interpretation  of  the  evidence
considered. 
3 How is the argument organised? The book is subdivided into four parts, of which the
first two, I think, carry the main weight of her case. The first part is directed at the
‘physics’ of Stoic thinking on individuality. Certainly, the Stoic conception of nature
and their general physicalism are significant for making sense of their psychology and
their distinctive ideas in this area. However, the main focus here is on an idea, that of
something being ‘uniquely’ or ‘distinctively’ qualified (idios poion), that figures in Stoic
logical analysis of categories, rather than physics. Our evidence on this topic derives
mainly from reports of a debate between Stoics and Academic sceptics about identity
and growth, which turns on what it means to say that something is ‘the same’ as itself
or other things. Bourbon refers, quite often, to this idea throughout the book, and cites
the prevalence of this idea to support her general claim that individuality, in the sense
of  unique  personal  identity,  plays  a  particularly  prominent  role  in  Stoic  thought.
However, as far as I can tell,  this theme plays an important role only in the rather
localised ancient debate about growth and sameness. It does not acquire the prominent
place that ‘personal identity’ has sometimes done in modern Western philosophy, with
theorists of different kinds taking up competing positions.
4 The second part of the book, building on the first,  argues that the Stoic concept of
individuality  is  conceived  in  subjective  terms.  In  maintaining  this  view,  Bourbon
focuses on the role of reflexive ideas (self-knowledge or self-perception) in the Stoic
theory  of  development  as  ‘appropriation’  (oikeiosis).  She  also  examines  the  idea  of
‘assent’  to  ‘impressions’  in  Stoic  psychology,  presenting  this  notion  as  one  which
expresses the concept of the individual as a distinctively subjective agent. A further
major theme is Epictetus’ usage (unusual in Stoic terms) of the notion of prohairesis.
This too is taken as an indication of individual subjectivity;  however,  the dominant
theme  here  is  not  so  much  self-awareness  but  that  of  a  whole-hearted  or  unified
response  and  the  idea  that  one’s  choices  also  imply  choice  of  a  way  of  life,  and
commitment to that  life.  In these senses,  it  is  claimed,  the Epictetan conception of
prohairesis  constitutes a subjective expression of individuality.  In addition,  the Stoic
(including Epictetan) use of the idea of daimon is presented as compatible with a focus
on  individual  subjectivity  in  the  sense  that  the  daimon  bridges  human  and  divine
spheres and is attached to people as individuals. 
5 In  the third part  of  the  book,  attention shifts  to  Stoic  writings  in  Latin,  especially
Seneca, placed in the context of Roman thought more generally, particularly that of
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Cicero. However, the concepts explored, and the claims made, are similar to those in
the  second  part.  The  key  terms  discussed  are  conscientia  and  voluntas.  The  main
connotations underlined are (in the case of conscientia), self-awareness, inner (mental)
space, and the treatment of another person as one’s mirror or reflection. In the case of
voluntas,  in  Seneca,  as  with  prohairesis  in  Epictetus,  the  stress  falls  on  the  idea  of
‘willing’ as expressing whole-hearted commitment. 
6 In the fourth part, the topic is the significance of the terms persona and prosopa. Here,
one might have expected a close study of the four-personae theory in Cicero, De Officiis
Book 1, with special attention to the second (individual) persona (a topic briefly covered
earlier in the book). However, Bourbon’s interest is broader, falling on the deployment
of these terms in general, in Cicero, Seneca and Epictetus. Also, the ideas reviewed are
those of role-playing (including internal role-playing) and the idea of the mind as an
inner  theatre.  These  features  are  seen  as  indications  of  subjectivity  (awareness  of
oneself in various guises) and also of self-creation (making yourself play this or that
role).
7 How convincing, overall, is this study; I take the positive points first. The book brings
together virtually all the evidence that is important for addressing the question of the
relevance of the ideas of subjectivity and individuality to Stoic thought, as presented in
Greek and Roman sources in different periods. It also discusses clearly and carefully the
various topics that represent the strongest support for this project, including the idea
of  ‘uniquely  qualified’  (idios  poion),  and  terms  for  self-consciousness,  willing  and
choosing, and roles. All the texts referred to are discussed lucidly, indeed elegantly, are
well-documented, illustrated by French translations (with Greek and Latin as needed),
and with up-to-date references especially to French and English scholarship. The layout
and organisation are clear; the book is supported by a full bibliography and several
indexes. The volume as a whole is attractively printed and its presentation reflects well
on the author, series editors and publisher.
8 My  main  reservations  are  those  stated  at  the  start  of  this  review.  The  key  terms
(individuality, subjectivity) are complex or ambiguous in meaning. However, Bourbon
never acknowledges this point, and seems to assume that they are unproblematically
self-evident in their significance. Also, she cites, at different stages, divergent features
as  indicators  of  these  ideas:  she  combines  ideas  about  unique  individuality  with
expressions of psychological agency that are characteristic of human beings as such.
Ideas about psychological cohesion and unified (whole-hearted) ‘willing’ are coupled
with ideas about internal division and complex mental role-playing. Broadly put, the
book contains most of the themes one might associate with psychological agency in
Stoic theory, but presented as being about ‘subjective individuality’. 
9 There is also the problem, highlighted earlier, that the key terms are modern ones, and,
indeed, ones that have played a key role in modern European thought and are highly
contested. Also, the question of their relevance to ancient, including Stoic, thought has
been debated in previous scholarship. While not ignoring these points, she does not, on
the other hand, incorporate an awareness of them into her analysis, although I think
could  have  enabled  more  acute  critical  reading  of  the  texts.  This  point  also  has
implications for her claim that Stoic psychology provided the context for the ‘genesis’
of the ideas of individuality and subjectivity – are the ancient and modern ideas really
the same? Further,  that claim is  itself  rather unexplored.  What broader features of
Stoicism (as distinct from other Hellenistic and Roman or earlier Greek thought) made
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this theory uniquely or especially suitable as the seedbed of these modern notions? And
can such claims be adequately explained without at least some reference to the social
and economic context of the philosophical ideas? 
10 In short, my reservations centre on broader conceptual questions raised by the project
rather than the detailed discussion, taken in its own terms. However, I hope that the
author will explore such questions in future work, using this comprehensive and well-
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